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substantially and worked on achieving a higher quality level of R&D. We analyze 
whether different R&D activities show a positive influence on total factor 
productivity (TFP) for firms of different ownership types and across two time 
periods. Our panel dataset with annual information allows us to study listed firms 
over the two time periods 2001-2006 and 2007-2011. Privately owned enterprises 
(POEs) not only obtain higher returns from own R&D than majority and minority 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs), they are also able to increase their leading 
position. Overall strong increases in the size of patent stocks are related to a 
decreasingly positive or even vanishing influence on TFP. POEs not only produce 
R&D of the highest quality but are also the only ownership type profiting from 
higher quality. Up to now research collaborations allow almost no benefit with the 
only exception stemming from domestic collaborations with individuals. Our 
comprehensive analysis depicts strengths but also weaknesses of the corporate 
sector in China. We derive implications for the further development of economic 
policies. 
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1 Introduction  
By now it has become consensus that a sustainable development of the Chinese economy is 
increasingly dependent on productivity gains instead of input factor accumulation. Unleashed 
by China’s transition from a planned towards a mixed market economy, competition and 
privatization have contributed to total factor productivity (TFP) gains ever since (Brandt et al. 
2012, Hsieh & Klenow 2009). Throughout the past years, China’s corporate sector has 
witnessed an unprecedented rise in R&D activities – observable by increases in R&D 
expenditures and patent applications of private and state-owned firms. Although the positive 
effect of R&D on productivity is well documented in the literature (e.g., Griliches & Mairesse 
1991 for developed economies, Hu 2001 for China up to the 1990s), China’s recent stunning 
surge in different R&D activities has not been investigated from that perspective.  
In this study we analyze whether the rise in R&D activities shows a positive and 
sustained influence on productivity of Chinese firms. Our analysis focuses on differences 
between majority and minority state ownership as well as private ownership and on 
differences in the impact of R&D activities throughout the time periods 2001-2006 and 2007-
2011. We investigate different aspects of R&D activities to allow not only for increasing 
quantity but also for differences in the quality and technological sophistication of R&D as 
well as considering the effectiveness of collaborative research activities. 
Before 2001, China’s R&D expenditures were below 1% of its GDP but doubled since 
then to exceed 2% in 2013. While this ratio is slightly above the EU-28 level, China now 
takes the second rank behind the US in terms of total R&D investments. Similarly, patent 
applications have experienced a remarkable surge and reached more than 700,000 in 2013 – 
making China’s patent office (SIPO) the global leader in terms of receiving national 
applications since 2011. Also in other legislations, such as Europe or the US, the Chinese 
share of patent applications increases strongly. However, so far it remains unclear whether 
China’s rise in R&D activities corresponds to higher TFP. Critics claim that the enormously 
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rising number of patent applications will only impact TFP growth if the economic value and 
technological sophistication of the underlying inventions is substantially improved (World 
Bank 2012). 
We address this issue by analyzing how R&D activities of the recent decade contribute 
to Chinese firms’ productivity. Previous studies have examined the influence of R&D on 
productivity only until the late 1990s. In these years, however, research was predominantly 
carried out by a few state-owned firms. From the beginning of the 2000s, R&D investments 
not only increased strongly but also improved in quality. Furthermore, against the background 
of China’s economic transition, a large number of minority state-owned and private-owned 
firms have joined China’s innovation efforts and contributed vigorously to R&D activities of 
China’s corporate sector. In this study we are therefore able to derive novel evidence for the 
productivity effects of R&D activities for state and non-state firms throughout the time period 
2001 to 2011. Since China’s “Medium- to Long-term Plan for Science and Technology 
Development (2006-2020)” (MLP) has brought considerable changes to its innovation policy, we 
separately investigate the time periods before and after its implementation. Against this 
background, we examine how heterogeneity in the volume, economic value, technological 
sophistication, and collaboration mechanisms of R&D activities influence the productivity of 
Chinese firms. 
For our empirical analysis we compile a unique panel dataset which covers the 
population of Chinese firms listed at the stock exchanges of mainland China. For the 
operationalization of our main variables, we combine accounting data including information 
on R&D expenditures with national patent applications. Our R&D variables provide rich 
information about forward citations, the share of high-tech patents, and domestic as well as 
international R&D collaborations. To account for potential endogeneity issues in productivity 
estimations, we follow the methodology proposed by Levinsohn & Petrin (2003). In addition, 
we verify the robustness of our main results by applying, first, the approach of Olley and 
Pakes (1996) and, second, system GMM estimation.  
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We briefly foreshadow our findings. Privately owned enterprises (POEs) not only 
achieve higher returns from own R&D than majority and minority state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs), they are also able to increase their leading position. Thus, exposure to competition 
seems to be beneficial for the efficiency of these firms. Overall strong increases in the size of 
patent stocks are related to a decreasingly positive or even vanishing influence on TFP. This 
outcome could be a result of an economic policy that puts much more emphasis on quantity 
instead of quality. POEs not only achieve research of the highest quality but are also the only 
ownership type profiting from higher quality. Up to now research collaborations bestow 
almost no benefit with the only exception stemming from domestic collaborations with 
individuals. In the future, it may be possible to achieve better outcomes, if increasing 
competition is leading firms to engage in collaborations that truly lead to knowledge gains 
and cost savings. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides information on 
the institutional background, Section 3 discusses prior literature and Section 4 explains our 
empirical method. We describe our data sources and our sample in Section 5 and present our 
results in Section 6. Section 7 derives implications and Section 8 concludes.  
2 Institutional Background 
State-owned firms versus non-state sector 
Beginning with China’s “reform and opening” in 1978, the transition from a centrally-planned 
to a mixed-market economy has been paralleled by a shift of economic activities from the 
state to the non-state sector. Non-state-owned firms were allowed to enter a number of 
previously prohibited industries and operated in increasingly deregulated and competitive 
markets (Xu 2011). While smaller non-state collectives in light industries mainly produced 
and sold consumer products at market prices, China’s larger state-owned firms in heavy 
industries remained shielded from competitors and sold capital goods according to a dual-
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price system (Zhu 2012).1 Despite the introduction of modern management techniques which 
linked income to firm performance, the state sector’s lack of competition, binding input and 
output quotas, and soft budget constraints facilitated a divergence in TFP growth between 
firms in the state and the non-state sector (Jefferson et al. 1996). 
Throughout the second reform decade from 1988 to 1998, the government let the non-
state sector grow but kept employment in the state sector constant in order to avoid social 
instability (Heilmann 2008). State-owned firms were still obliged to sell a share of their 
products below market prizes but were protected from looming bankruptcy by preferential 
access to credit (Holz 2003, p. 75). In contrast, firms in the non-state sector were facing hard 
budget constraints for investment and had to excel against a growing number of entrants 
started by entrepreneurs or emanating from restructured state entities and foreign-invested 
firms (Naughton 2007, p. 309). As a result, TFP growth in the domestic non-state sector 
remained above the growth rate of the state sector (Jefferson et al. 2000).  
Since 1998, deep structural transformation accelerated the privatization of former 
state-owned firms and, subsequently, the establishment of private firms has become formally 
legalized (Zhu 2012). Throughout the late 1990s and early 2000s, many state-owned firms 
and collectives were closed or privatized (Yusuf et al. 2006, p. 86). When measured by either 
the number of firms or share in industrial gross output, the state sector has lost considerably in 
economic importance. For instance, the contribution of state-owned firms to gross industrial 
output has decreased from above 70% in the early 1990s to around 20% in 2001 and has 
reached 8% in 2012 (NBS 2014).  
However, even after 30 years of reforms, the socialist legacy is still apparent at state-
owned firms, for example through higher levels of capital accumulation, preferential access to 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
 
 
 
 
1 The dual  price system is characterized by the coexistence of prices fixed by the government for a selection of 
high-priority goods with prices allowed to adjust according to supply and demand for an increasing share of 
remaining products. 
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financial resources, profits from monopoly rights in a number of industries,2 and protection 
from foreign competition (Zhu 2012, Branstetter & Feenstra 2002, Amiti & Jovorcik 2008). 
Excessive labor from the shrinking state sector has been partially absorbed by the non-state 
sector. In addition, non-state firms have benefited from rural-urban migration and 
demographic trends which, until recently, have contributed to a surplus of Chinese labor 
which kept wages competitively low. Reflected in differences in factor endowment, 
production in the state sector remains more capital intensive whereas the non-state sector is 
more labor intensive.  
Following the latest wave of structural reforms and China’s accession to the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, the possibility of bankruptcy for unprofitable firms in the 
state sector and the reduction of excessive labor ultimately contributed to enormous TFP 
gains. For 1998 and 2007, Zhu (2012) reports an annual average TFP growth rate of 5.50% 
for the state sector which, for the first time since the reforms, has outpaced the growth rate of 
3.67% in the non-state sector. These trends are confirmed by Jefferson et al. (2008) who 
examine multi-factor productivity by ownership type throughout the time period 1998 to 2005 
and report a growth rate of 15.63% for the state sector – roughly twice as high as in the non-
state sector.  
While there is conflicting evidence for China’s overall TFP growth rate and the 
contribution of TFP to output (see Tian & Yu 2012 for a meta-analysis), recent studies have 
investigated drivers of TFP at the firm level and have pointed out that a significant portion of 
TFP gains can indeed be attributed to the reallocation of resources from the state to the non-
state sector. For China’s manufacturing firms, Hsieh & Klenow (2009) evaluate the 
contribution of capital and labor reallocation among incumbents on aggregate TFP growth 
between 1998 and 2005. They find that a more efficient allocation within manufacturing 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
 
 
 
 
2 These industries include energy, transportation, telecommunication, banking, entertainment, education, and 
health care. 
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industries contributes 2 percentage points to annual TFP growth and that competition 
increases aggregated TFP by raising within-firm productivity as well as by a more efficient 
allocation of inputs to more productive firms. Based on the same data set, Brandt et al. (2012) 
study the effects of entrants for the time period 1998 to 2007 and find that net entries of firms 
account for over two thirds of total TFP growth.  
R&D activities in the economy 
Despite substantial gains from improving resource allocation, this source of TFP 
growth will abate with increasing levels of efficiency in the economy. In addition, political 
and institutional barriers have prevented further efforts to privatize the remaining state sector 
so far. As an alternative source through which China’s TFP growth may be sustained, 
Jefferson et al. (1999) propose investments in industrial R&D. Throughout China’s planned 
and early transition period, R&D was mainly performed by research institutes and, to a lesser 
extent, by universities while firms functioned as pure manufacturing units (Hong 2008, Liu 
2009). China’s command economy aimed at plan fulfillment and provided firms with little 
incentives to engage in intramural R&D activities or R&D collaborations with universities or 
research institutes. The resulting lack of industry-science collaboration negatively impacted 
the industrial applicability of domestic R&D and thus considerably reduced the development 
of new products and production processes by firms (Liu & White 2001).  
In 1999, China’s State Council decided to accelerate economic development through 
innovation, high technology, and industrialization (Liu et al. 2011). In the following years, 
R&D operations have increasingly been relocated from research institutes to firms in state and 
non-state sectors. In addition, China’s accession to the WTO strengthened the protection of 
intellectual property rights through the enforcement of the Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (Kim et al. 2012). After 2006, China’s “Medium- to 
Long-term Plan for Science and Technology Development (2006-2020)” (MLP) has again 
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provided a considerable stimulus for China’s innovation policy, with a main emphasis on 
increasing the economy’s technological sovereignty. 
Indeed, China’s R&D activities have intensified substantially in the time period after 
2001, as observed by considerable increases in R&D investments and in invention patent 
applications by domestic actors (see Figure 1). From 1990 until 2001, the ratio of R&D 
expenditures to GDP stagnated below 1% and patents had only increased from around 6,000 
to 30,000 applications annually. After 2001, China’s R&D to GDP ratio surpassed the 1% 
benchmark of developing countries and even doubled afterwards to reach 2% in 2013 – which 
is slightly above the EU-28 level. In terms of the volume of R&D investments, China now 
takes the second rank behind the US. Similarly, patent applications have experienced a 
remarkable surge and reached 700,000 in 2013 – making China the leading country in annual 
patent applications since 2011.  
Against this background, the industrial contribution to inputs and intermediate outputs 
of invention has become clearly observable. In 2012, firms have contributed 76% to domestic 
gross R&D expenditures and 59% to domestic invention patent applications. As R&D 
activities obtained a larger prominence in economic policy, measures to support R&D also 
professionalized. For the mid-1990s, Guan and Yam (2015) show that financial incentives of 
the government, i.e. tax credits, special loans, and R&D grants, have a neutral or negative 
effect on patents. Boeing (2014) finds that R&D subsidies, on average, cause a crowding-out 
of firms’ own R&D investments throughout the time period 2001 to 2006. However, for the 
time period after the enforcement of the MLP, 2007 to 2011, Deng & Hu (2014) investigate 
R&D activities of occasional R&D performers and find an increase in the amount and the 
continuity of R&D investments as well as in the number of patent applications – indicating an 
improving effectiveness of policy measures after 2006. The increase in the effectiveness of 
China’s R&D programs is confirmed by Guo et al. (2014). Throughout the time period 1999 
to 2011, the authors show a positive effect for Innofund subsidies (i.e., subsidies by the 
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Innovation Fund for Small and Medium Technology-based Firms) on patent applications 
which becomes significantly stronger after 2005.  
With respect to China’s surge in patent applications, for the time period 2001 to 2007 
Li (2012) shows that the enforcement of provincial patent subsidies has contributed to the 
increase in patent applications and that a larger fraction of applications got granted. In line 
with the implementation of the MLP in 2006, Lei et al. (2013) study the effect of local patent 
subsidies for filing fees and grant rewards on applications and grants of Chinese invention 
patents. Their findings suggest that the number of applications per patentee increases while 
the number of claims per patent and the corresponding grant rate remains constant. The 
authors infer that financial incentives for grants motivate patentees to split up inventions to 
yield a maximum number of patents – possibly leading to a decrease of the average economic 
value of patent applications after 2006. Thus, while policy measures have become more 
effective in stimulating R&D investment and patent applications after 2006, they may also 
have contributed to a decline in the average value of patents filed by Chinese applicants. 
R&D collaborations 
Firms can conduct their R&D collaborations with other firms or with research 
institutes. Guan et al. (2006) investigate how several forms of technology exchange influence 
the innovative performance of Chinese firms. For collaboration with domestic partners and 
international partners they expect but cannot confirm a positive influence on innovative 
performance. 
In line with China’s increasing emphasis on industrial R&D, hundreds of research 
institutes have been transformed into more commercially-oriented entities or directly 
restructured into firms (Jakobson 2007) while universities started to conduct more applied 
R&D and founded numerous firms as spin-offs (Eun et al. 2006, Hu & Mathews 2008). 
Following the enforcement of China’s “Bayh-Dole Act” in 1999, which allowed universities 
to patent research outcomes derived from government-funded R&D, and the decentralization 
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of national R&D activities, formal science-industry collaborations, as observable by joint 
patent applications, have increased in recent years (Hong 2008). In line with the argument that 
knowledge externalities are geographically constrained, Hong & Su (2013) find in general 
that geographical proximity is supportive to university-industry collaborations in China. In 
addition, greater distance increases the probability of collaboration for highly prestigious 
universities as they are sought out by industry partners to solve specialist problems. However, 
despite the increase in university-industry collaborations, Fu & Li (2012) find that 
collaboration with Chinese universities does not contribute significantly to firms’ sales of 
products which are new to the market.  
3 Prior Evidence on the R&D-productivity Relationship 
A series of prior studies has examined productivity returns to R&D activities based on 
Chinese firm level data. In his seminal study, Hu (2001) uses cross-sectional data on 813 
firms for 1995 to investigate the effect of R&D expenditures on TFP. The data of this study is 
restricted to high-tech firms of the Haidian District of Beijing, thus covering the most 
sophisticated firms at the time. After excluding domestic privately-owned firms due to their 
limited number, he investigates the effects of firms’ own investment in R&D and the effect of 
R&D expenses subsidized by the government. Using OLS estimation, his results show a 
significant R&D elasticity of 0.08%, i.e. a 1% increase in own R&D leads to a statistically 
significant increase of 0.08% in TFP. In the instrumental variable (IV) specification, the 
elasticity increases to 0.32%. For R&D subsidies, both specifications indicate an insignificant 
effect on TFP. By reestimating the IV specification according to ownership types, Hu (2001) 
finds significant returns to own R&D investments for almost all groups with firms owned by 
the government having the lowest output elasticity. Since R&D intensities vary little across 
ownership types, this finding suggests that firms in the non-state sector yield higher returns to 
R&D. 
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Jefferson et al. (2006) investigate the influence of R&D on several performance 
measures for approximately 20,000 large- and medium-size manufacturing firms from the 
state- and non-state-sector, grouped according to seven different ownership types. They 
conduct a cross-sectional analysis including lagged regressors covering the years 1997-1999. 
Using an IV approach, the authors estimate returns to R&D based on a Cobb-Douglas 
production function with the restriction that R&D elasticities are assumed to be constant 
across all ownership types. Differences in the effectiveness of R&D are then calculated by 
transforming the elasticity into returns resulting in unusually high returns between 55% to 
178%. The relatively high returns of 138% for SOEs are in contrast to Hu (2001) and may be 
due to the high ratio of output to R&D of this specific ownership type.  
Hu and Jefferson (2004) estimate returns to R&D for 88 R&D-performing large- and 
medium-sized, mainly state-owned, industrial firms located in Beijing throughout the time 
period 1991-1997. Besides an R&D expenditure equation, they also estimate a production 
function and a profit function. For the Cobb-Douglas production function, they find a 
significant elasticity for R&D which, after being transformed into returns, shows a declining 
influence on productivity over time. 
Focusing on the complementarity between in-house R&D and technology transfer via 
the acquisition of disembodied technology, Hu et al. (2005) analyze data on approximately 
10,000 of China’s large- and medium-sized firms over the time period 1995 to 1999. The 
authors estimate a production function with interaction terms confirming a complementary 
relationship between in-house R&D and technology transfer from both domestic and 
international sources. When restricting the sample to foreign invested firms (FIEs), the 
complementarity between in-house R&D and technology transfer from international sources 
vanishes, as these firms might not be dependent on this form of knowledge. 
Zhang et al. (2003) apply the method of stochastic frontier analysis to examine the 
impact of R&D investments of 8,341 Chinese industrial firms for the year 1995. The authors 
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confirm Hu’s (2001) finding that state-owned firms have the lowest returns to R&D. In 
addition, Zhang et al. (2003) find that the R&D intensity of firms is not endogenous to their 
own R&D efficiency since state-owned firms report relatively high levels of R&D intensities. 
Due to their negligible importance at the time, POEs had to be excluded from the analysis. 
What these studies have in common is their focus on the time period before China’s 
accession to the WTO in 2001, as they use cross-sectional or panel data from the period 1991 
to 1999. Consequently, the evidence derived reflects a situation in which China’s R&D 
activities were at relatively low levels. This is in stark contrast to the increase in R&D 
investments and patent applications observable after 2001. Furthermore, these studies could 
not take into account the performance of purely privately-owned firms as all firms were more 
or less state-owned. The recent surge in the number of POEs demands a specific analysis of 
their performance. As prior studies rely on cross-sectional data or rather short panels, they are 
not able to investigate changes in the effectiveness of R&D over time. We are not aware of 
more recent studies covering the influence of firm-level R&D on productivity, which is 
probably due to the difficulty of obtaining comprehensive information on R&D expenditures. 
4 Method 
4.1 Dealing with Endogeneity 
When estimating production functions, we have to deal with the problem that firms adjust 
their input factors to current productivity shocks. As the productivity shocks are unobserved, 
this leads to a correlation between the error term and the input factors and thus to biased 
coefficient estimates. In a setting with two input factors, one would typically expect the 
coefficient on the variable factor (labor) to be overestimated and the coefficient on the fixed 
factor (capital) to be underestimated. Several approaches have been developed to break the 
correlation between the unobserved productivity shock and the choice of input factors, each 
with their own advantages and disadvantages. 
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Guided by theoretical expectations about expected biases in results, we select the 
appropriate estimation method for our data by comparing OLS results to the approaches 
developed by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) and Olley and Pakes (1996). Applying all three 
approaches, we estimate a standard Cobb-Douglas production function in two variants: first, 
with gross output as dependent variable and labor, capital and material costs as main input 
variables and, second, with value added as dependent variable and labor and capital as main 
input variables. 
The main method used for our analysis is the control function approach developed by 
Levinsohn & Petrin (2003), (LP in the following), which treats labor and intermediates as 
variable input factors and capital as a quasi-fix input factor. The authors present an estimator 
that uses intermediate inputs as proxy for the unobserved productivity shock. Their approach 
can be explained as follows: first the demand function of intermediates is computed which is 
assumed to be directly related to productivity. Then, in the second step, they build on this 
intermediate demand function to reveal the unobservable productivity as a function of the 
intermediate input and capital. In the estimation the unobservable error term is not expected to 
correlate with the independent variables. Since the approach of LP seems adequate for our 
setting, we primarily rely on this estimator for our analysis.  
We also investigate the appropriateness of the control function approach developed by 
Olley and Pakes (1996), (OP in the following). The approach of OP relies on investments as a 
proxy for the productivity shock. In the standard form, OP uses a three-stage estimation with 
one stage used to model the exit of firms. We find exit of firms – measured as exit from the 
stock market – to be very rare in our data. We therefore adjust the OP algorithm to only 
include the control for simultaneity but not the control for selection. One potential 
disadvantage of OP compared to LP is the need to restrict the sample to observations with 
positive values for investment. The resulting loss of efficiency is of limited importance in our 
dataset as only 0.4% of observations show zero investments. From a theoretical point of view 
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a more important argument in favor of LP is that intermediates may respond more smoothly 
to productivity shocks than investment. If firms face non-convex adjustment costs, they may 
not fully adjust the investment level to the realization of the productivity shock. According to 
Levinsohn & Petrin (2003) this may be especially the case for firms outside of fully 
developed Western economies. 
The LP approach chosen for our main analysis only controls for the potential 
endogeneity of the input factors labor, material, and capital but the R&D activities of the 
Chinese firms are also potentially endogenous inputs. For example, large investments in R&D 
are a costly endeavor that only firms with sufficient financial resources can afford. Since a 
high productivity is positively related to profitability, there may be a danger of reverse 
causality. As we are not able to control for the potential endogeneity of the R&D activities 
with the LP approach, our results should accordingly be interpreted as correlations.  
We take up this limitation in our robustness checks. In addition to reporting results 
with the alternative control function approach of OP, we report results with lagged R&D 
variables for both the LP and OP procedure. By using lagged variables, we drive a wedge in 
the time dimension between the realization of the productivity shock and the decision on the 
input factors thus alleviating the potential endogeneity of R&D. In addition, we report system 
GMM results that are able to instrument the R&D variables as well. This estimation method is 
rather demanding concerning the data used since identification relies only on the variation 
within a given firm and since several tests on the auto-correlation of the error term and the 
validity of the instruments need to be passed. It turns out that our data does not completely 
comply with the requirements of these tests. 
4.2 Specification of the Regression Models 
The variables reflecting R&D activities (e.g., R&D stock, patent stock) are of main interest 
for our study; especially in their interactions with ownership dummy variables and time 
period dummies. This way, we seek to carve out differences with regard to R&D activities 
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which are driven by ownership type and/or are changing over time. As general control 
variables we include presence in a policy zone, engagement in an industry where FDI is 
encouraged, regional income levels, industry dummies, year dummies, and province 
dummies. Thus, we control for a broad set of factors which might influence firms’ 
productivity. 
We estimate basic production functions (table 4) and include, first, R&D stock (table 
5) and, second, patent stock (table 6). Thereafter, we account for quality-adjusted R&D efforts 
(table 7) and research collaborations (table 8). While the baseline model of each table uses 
R&D stock or patent stock to consider R&D efforts, we use – in the other models of these 
tables – the following approach to investigate the effect of ownership types and time periods 
for various R&D activities: we split the regressor R&Dit indicating one specific R&D activity 
(such as R&D stock or patent stock) in J categories with dj indicating the category as a 
dummy variable: 
lnሺGross	output௜௧ሻ ൌ 	ߚ଴ ൅	ߚଵ lnሺLabor௜௧ሻ ൅ ߚଶ lnሺCapital௜௧ሻ ൅ ߚଷ lnሺMaterial௜௧ሻ 
൅෍൫ߛ௝ܴ&ܦ୧୲d୨൯
୎
୨ୀଵ
൅෍ሺߜ௞x୩	୧୲ሻ ൅ ߝ௜௧
୏
୩ୀଵ
 
Ownership type has three categories (i.e., J = 3) and the period of time has two 
categories (i.e., J = 2). If we combine the three ownership types with the two time periods, six 
categories result (i.e., J = 6). We use this approach for multiple variables reflecting different 
facets of R&D activity. xk it indicates additional control variables. 
Concerning ownership type, we split the R&D stock into three new variables (that is, 
one variable each for majority SOEs, minority SOEs, and POEs). This allows us to scrutinize 
the effect of R&D according to the ownership structure of the firm. Correspondingly, we 
divide the sample into an early period, 2001-2006, and a late period, 2007-2011. Accordingly, 
we split R&D stock in two variables – either for the earlier period or the later period. The 
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later period coincides with the period after the MLP was launched in 2006. The MLP laid out 
the innovation policies for the coming decade. It can be almost seen as an exogenous policy 
shock as much more emphasis was given to incentives for R&D activity and the incentives 
came from the highest level of the government (Liu et al. 2011). Furthermore, from 2007 on, 
firms had an incentive to patent and to collaborate in order to be classified as high-tech firm 
and to receive support in the form of subsidies from the government. 
5 Data 
5.1 Data Sources and Sample 
Our dataset includes comprehensive information about Chinese firms listed in the A-share 
segment of the two stock exchanges in mainland China, Shanghai and Shenzhen. We obtained 
accounting data from the global database Compustat for the time period from 2001 to 2011 
and complemented the data with employment information from Datastream. R&D 
expenditures for the years 2001 to 2005 were manually collected from annual reports 
(CNINFO), whereas for the years 2006 to 2011 they were obtained from the Chinese database 
WIND. As the role of ownership is one focus of the analysis, we included time variant 
information on the share of state ownership from the Chinese database RESSET. Patent data 
is obtained from the April 2013 version of the EPO Worldwide Patent Statistical Database 
(PATSTAT). The procedure of matching patent data to firm data is described in detail in 
appendix A. Our sample of listed firms includes many of China’s largest firms and firms with 
political or economic importance (Du & Xu 2009). Only domestic firms, which are defined by 
the China Securities Regulatory Commission (2002, 2006) as firms in which the ownership 
share of foreign parties does not exceed 20%, can be listed on the stock exchanges of 
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Shanghai and Shenzhen. We start our analysis in the year 2001 because R&D and patenting 
activities by Chinese firms were not widespread before.3  
Initially, our data includes 2,363 firms for which we have 16,734 observations with 
non-missing accounting information.4 We exclude 2,436 observations from the financial and 
the retail sector because R&D activities are of limited importance in these sectors. In order to 
eliminate outliers, we delete firm-year observations that exhibit values above the 99th or 
below the 1st percentile of the following ratios: revenue-to-employees, revenue-to-capital, 
revenue-to-material, employees-to-capital, employees-to-material, and material-to-capital. 
Our full estimation sample is based on information for 1,927 firms for which we have 12,443 
observations.  
Due to the dynamic development of the Chinese stock market, our panel data is 
unbalanced. We start of in the year 2001 with 790 firms, increasing to 1,776 firms in 2011. 
On average a firm is observed 6.5 times. The stock markets in Shanghai and Shenzhen were 
both founded in 1990 and then dynamically increased the number of listings. Until the mid-
2000s, the central government determined stock issuance quotas to maintain a balance 
between the regions at China’s stock markets (Pistor & Xu 2005). Provinces with sound 
economic performance obtained higher quotas and provincial governments selected firms for 
initial public offerings (Du & Xu 2009). The resulting composition of listed firms adequately 
reflects China’s economic development, with an emphasis on better performing firms. For 
example, manufacturing firms from coastal provinces represent the majority while the 
remaining industries and provinces are included to a lesser extent. Figures 2 and 3 show the 
development of firm locations between 2001 and 2011. As we have only a few delistings in 
our sample, the unbalancedness of our panel data is driven by the expansion of the stock 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
 
 
 
 
3 The financial information of listed Chinese firms is now sufficiently precise so that it can be used for high-
quality research (see, e.g., Fisman & Wang 2010, Kato & Long 2006). 
4 This initial data covers the near-population of listed firms. The stock market of mainland China consists of only 
two stock exchanges. In the year 2011 we cover 98.3% of the 1,411 firms listed in Shenzhen and 95.5% of the 
931firms listed in Shanghai. 
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market and not by the exit of unsuccessful firms. We therefore do not expect biases in our 
results from the unbalancedness per se. However, one has to keep in mind that our analysis is 
representative for the most successful firms in China. 
5.2 Definition of Main Variables 
This section defines our main variables. Detailed definitions for all variables, used deflators, 
and references to data sources can be found in appendix B (see table B1). As output variable 
of our production function we use two measures: gross output and value added of the firm. 
Concerning the former, we use total revenues whereas, concerning the latter, value added is 
calculated as revenue minus material costs. 
The basic components of the production function are labor, capital and – dependent on 
the specification of the model – material costs. With respect to labor, we use the number of 
employees of the firms and regarding capital, we use deflated net fixed assets denoted in 
RMB. Material costs are calculated as the difference between deflated costs of goods sold and 
labor costs, also denoted in RMB.  
To compute R&D assets, we use the time series of each firm’s R&D expenditures and 
compute the R&D stock applying the declining balance formula following Hall et al. (2005) 
with a depreciation rate of 15%. To be precise, the R&D stock in year t is the R&D 
expenditures of that year plus the R&D stock in year t-1 depreciated by 15%. To account for 
those firms publishing no R&D expenditures – either because they actually conduct no R&D 
or because they refrain from reporting R&D spending – we created a dummy variable that 
turns 1 if no R&D stock can be established, and 0 otherwise. 
Concerning the patent variables, three important methodological aspects need to be 
noted. First, the Chinese patent system consists of innovation, utility, and design patents. As 
innovation patents are the most valuable and have the highest novelty standard, we 
concentrate on those. Second, we base our measures on patent families instead of patent 
applications since the number of families more closely corresponds to the number of 
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inventions. When compiling patent families, we rely on the INPADOC family definition 
available in PATSTAT which combines all applications that share at least one priority into 
one family. Third, when calculating stocks we apply the usual 15% annual depreciation rate 
(Hall et al. 2005) to account for the fact that technology becomes obsolete over time.  
We transform our measure of state ownership, which is ranging from 0% to 100%, 
into a set of three dummy variables representing the ownership category: first, privately-
owned firms without any state holding of the shares (POEs); second, state-owned with the 
state holding more than 50% of the shares (majority SOEs); and third, state-owned with a the 
state holding a less than 50% but more than 0% of the shares (minority SOEs). Dummy 
variables are time variant, i.e. firms can be allocated to different ownership types over time. 
5.3 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of our sample for all Chinese firms in total and, in 
addition, for the three subsamples according to firms’ ownership type. Our main sample 
consists of 12,443 observations for 1,927 firms. 18.4% of all observations in the total sample 
can be attributed to majority SOEs, 34% to minority SOEs, and 47.6% to POEs. On average, 
the firms in our sample have 4,687 employees. The standard deviation of 18,490 reflects a 
broad range of firm size also indicated by a minimum of nine employees and a maximum of 
more than 550,000 employees. On average, the firms yield revenues of 4,404 million RMB 
and a capital stock of 1,820 million RMB, again exhibiting a broad range. Majority SOEs are 
generally two to three times larger than minority SOEs and POEs.  
As basic R&D activities, we measure both R&D stock and patent stock. On average, 
Chinese firms have annual R&D expenditures of 32.8 million RMB which accumulate to an 
average stock of 76.6 million RMB. There is no R&D activity reported for 52.4% of all 
observations. In contrast to the clear size advantage of majority SOEs as measured by 
standard accounting figures, POEs and majority SOEs exhibit an R&D stock of similar size, 
which is higher than that of minority SOEs. The average annual number of applications for 
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patents amounts to 7.5 patents leading to a stock of 20.2 patents. The difference in patenting 
activity is again indicated by a rather large standard deviation and a maximum for the patent 
stock of 18,812 patents.5 With regard to patent stock, the original size pattern reverses: POEs 
have the highest numbers of patent filings whereas majority SOEs have the lowest. Here it 
can be seen that a lower state ownership share is accompanied by more intensive R&D 
efforts.  
Concerning the quality level of firms’ R&D efforts, we find that firms’ patents were 
able to induce on average 0.053 forward citations during a 3-year time window after 
publication. The share of patents relating to at least one high-tech technology classification 
yields 18.2% on average. Regarding these quality characteristics of firms’ patent portfolios, 
we again find higher values for those firms where ownership share of the state is smaller: 
POEs yield 0.059 forward citations compared to 0.033 for majority SOEs. Also, the share of 
high-tech patents is higher for POEs (18.8%) than for majority SOEs (14.5%).  
On average, firms hold a stock of 4.2 patents which are jointly filed with national co-
applicants and 0.26 patents with international co-applicants. 6  With regard to this R&D 
activity, POEs also exhibit a higher number of patents (6.75) than minority SOEs (1.66) and 
majority SOEs (0.62). Yet this pattern does not hold true for patents jointly filed with 
international co-applicants. Here, minority SOEs have clearly the highest activity with a mean 
of 0.43 whereas majority SOEs have a mean of 0.23 and POEs a mean of only 0.16.  
15.2% of all observations concern firms located in policy zones and 58% of the 
observations are subject to a firm operating in an industry where FDI is encouraged by the 
Chinese government. POEs have a higher probability of being located in policy zones and 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
 
 
 
 
5 The distribution of the patent stock variable is very skew. The firms with the largest (depreciated) patent stocks 
are ZTE (18,811 patents), China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation (4,254 patents), and TCL (1,561). These are 
among the firms that also show up in other publications as largest applicants (e.g., WIPO 2014). 
6 Since our measure of co-applications is meant to identify collaborations across firm borders, we have to be 
careful to eliminate collaboration partners which belong to the same group as the focal firm. As 32% of all 
national collaborations with a firm as a partner happened actually within a group, this is a quite important 
phenomenon in our data. 
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operating in an industry where FDI is encouraged whereas majority SOEs are more likely to 
be shielded from international competition. The mean of regional GDP per capita is 47,210 
RMB with POEs being located in regions with higher income. 
As the Chinese economy develops at a high pace, it is of interest to investigate the 
firm characteristics across time. Table 2 sets out – in a similar manner as table 1 – two 
subsamples for different time periods: the years 2001 through 2006 and 2007 through 2011. 
Concerning all financial metrics, we find that Chinese firms are growing at a rapid pace: the 
firms on average have 3,827 employees in the earlier period and 5,388 in the later period. The 
increasing importance of R&D activities can clearly be seen when analyzing the R&D stock. 
In the period of 2001 to 2006 this variable shows an average value of 15.9 million RMB in 
contrast to a mean of 126.1 million RMB in the later period. Correspondingly, the share of 
observations where no R&D stock could be observed decreases significantly (74.1% vs. 
34.6%). Similarly, the patent stock yields 6.2 patents in the earlier period and 31.6 patents in 
the later period. The dummy indicating that no patent activity could be observed shrinks from 
62.5% to 32.6%.  
Concerning the quality of firms’ R&D, the firms collected 0.037 forward citations on 
average in the earlier period and 0.060 in the later. Recall that for any patent – either filed in 
the earlier or in the later period – the same time window of three years is applied to collect 
citations. However, the high-tech share of patents in the portfolio does not increase 
correspondingly: we find that in the earlier period 17.7% of firms’ patents were filed in high-
tech IPC classes and 18.3% in the later period. Whereas the stock of patents filed jointly with 
national co-applicants rises significantly from 0.94 patents to 5.68 patents, the patents filed 
jointly with international co-applicants exhibits a smaller increase: from 0.23 in the earlier 
period to only 0.27 in the later period.  
As one would expect from the rapid transformation of the Chinese economy, the 
distribution of ownership types changes substantially from the earlier to the later period. In 
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the earlier period, a largely even distribution can be observed: 30.0% of all observations are 
majority SOEs, 37.7% are minority SOEs and 32.3% are POEs. In the later period, this 
distribution strongly shifts to more private ownership stakes. Majority SOEs only amount to 
7.8%, minority SOEs to 30.0%, and 62.2% of all observations concern POEs.  
Being located in a policy zone is not a characteristic that changes in a major way 
between the two time periods but, in the later period, more observations are in industries 
where FDI is encouraged (62.5% vs. 48.0%). 
Table 3 shows the industry distribution of our sample. The high share of firms from 
the manufacturing sector (75.9%) is representative for the overall Chinese economy. 
However, the sample also contains firms from the other sectors of the economy, such as 
agriculture, mining, construction, and information technology. 
6 Empirical Analysis 
6.1 Basic Production Functions 
Table 4 presents the estimations of the basic production functions. Here, we compare different 
estimation methods and different regression specifications. With regard to different estimation 
methods, we estimate the basic production function with OLS, LP and OP. Concerning 
different specifications, we employ gross output and valued added as dependent variables. 
These variations lead to six different models. Note that the input variables enter the regression 
models in the form of logarithms. All models include a full set of industry, province, and year 
dummies. 
For comparison we report first the biased OLS results with gross output as dependent 
variable (model 1). Due to unobserved productivity shocks, we expect an upward bias for the 
coefficients of the variable input factors labor and material and a downward bias for capital. 
Following, we describe the results using the LP approach in detail (model 2) and 
thereafter briefly compare these results to the other estimation techniques. As generally 
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anticipated, we observe a significant coefficient for labor (0.100 with p < 0.001), for capital 
(0.279 with p < 0.001), and also for material (0.591 with p < 0.001).7 Concerning R&D 
activities, we also find a significant coefficient for the R&D stock (0.004 with p < 0.001). The 
fact of not having any R&D expenditures is not significantly related to productivity (-0.008 
with p > 0.1). With respect to ownership types, we find that minority SOEs exhibit a 4.3% 
lower productivity (p < 0.01) than majority SOEs. The spread is lower for POEs with a 
difference of -2.8% (p < 0.05).8 If the firm is located in a policy zone, it has a 2.6% higher 
productivity (p < 0.1). Chinese FDI guidelines define in which industries FDI is encouraged. 
Consequently, the level of foreign competition varies. If a firm is doing business in an 
industry in which FDI is encouraged, we find productivity to be 4.1% (p < 0.001) lower 
compared to firms in other industries. This is consistent with Kamal (2014) who finds 
partially negative effects of foreign invested firms on domestic firms. In order to control for 
the level of development of the local economy, we include GDP per capita at the regional 
level. This variable accounts for agglomeration effects, the quality of the infrastructure, and 
the educational level of the labor force and thus for the quality of the labor input. In model 2, 
this variable is insignificant but in other specifications it has a positive significant effect. 
When comparing the coefficients for the input factors between LP (model 2) and OLS 
(model 1), we find a very similar coefficient for labor. For the fixed input factor capital we 
find, as theoretically expected, a higher coefficient in LP than in OLS, whereas for material 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
 
 
 
 
7 Estimating a production function for a large sample of large and medium sized manufacturing firms, Jefferson 
et al. (2006, p. 358) find similar input coefficients (labor 0.121, capital 0.120, material 0.749). Our coefficient 
for material corresponds roughly to material’s average value share of 0.621 in the sample. Chinese firms employ 
a relatively high share of intermediate products in their production processes. 
8 Earlier studies covering time periods in the 1990s throughout the mid-2000s have mostly found lower 
productivity levels for SOEs than for POEs (see Tian & Yu 2012 for a survey of that literature). However, more 
recent studies by Zhu (2012) and Jefferson et al. (2008) observe higher TFP growth rates for SOEs after 1998 – a 
trend which is reflected by our data in TFP levels. Furthermore, note that only listed firms are included in our 
sample. Until the early 2000s, stock market listings were restricted to well-performing SOEs while the number 
of POEs has only later been increasing due to the privatization of listed firms and new listings of POEs. In 
contrast to most SOEs, not all of China’s well-performing POEs have gone public in Mainland China, e.g. 
Huawei and Lenovo are not listed in Shanghai or Shenzhen. Thus, a bias towards well-performing SOEs and a 
higher TFP growth rate of the state sector may explain why we find higher TFP levels for majority SOEs than 
for POEs. But also note that when we only differentiate between SOEs as a whole and POEs, the difference 
between the two groups is not significant.  
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we observe, also as theoretically expected, the reverse pattern. We therefore conclude that the 
approach of LP is generally appropriate for dealing with endogeneity in our setting. 
We also compare the results of the control function approach by OP (model 3) to OLS 
(model 1). 9  Coefficients on the variable inputs labor and material have a similar size. 
However, the coefficient on capital is smaller in OP even though theoretically it should be 
larger than the downward-biased coefficient of OLS. We infer from the results that 
accounting for productivity shocks by using investment in the control function is less suitable 
for our specific dataset. As a side argument for LP as main method, we note that this approach 
results in almost constant returns to scale (0.97 with p < 0.1), whereas OP shows decreasing 
returns to scale with a value of 0.85 (p < 0.001). However, as OP is a method commonly used 
in the literature, we will nevertheless report robustness checks with this method. 
Finally, we compare the results of the gross output specifications (models 1-3) to the 
results of the value added specifications (models 4-6). As the labor coefficient should be 
overestimated in OLS (model 4) it is reasonable to find a smaller coefficient in LP (model 5) 
and a weakly smaller coefficient in OP (model 6). However, the capital coefficient is also 
decreasing in LP and OP, which is not what we would have expected theoretically. The value 
added specification is less flexible compared to the gross output specification because it 
constrains material inputs to a one-to-one relationship with gross output. As the value added 
specifications do not comply with theoretical expectations and also due to their lower 
flexibility, we choose the LP approach with gross output as dependent variable as the main 
specification for the remainder of the study.10 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
 
 
 
 
9 The number of observations is lower in OP compared to LP as observations with zero investment have to be 
disregarded. 
10 The specification with value added has more observations than the one with gross output because in the data 
cleaning procedure we eliminate the highest and lowest percentile in the ratios of the main input and output 
variables. As the value added specification has one fewer input, more observations remain. 
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6.2 Effectiveness of R&D Activities Across Ownership Types and Over 
Time 
6.2.1 Effectiveness of R&D 
In Table 5, we investigate the effectiveness of R&D by ownership type and over time. Across 
the models set out in table 5, we introduce various specifications highlighting different 
context dependent effects of the R&D stock. As described above, we split the R&D stock in 
new variables based on the context of the observation. For each of the three ownership types, 
we create the R&D stock variable based on whether the observation belongs to a majority 
SOE, a minority SOE, or a POE (model 2 in table 5). This allows us to compare the 
effectiveness of R&D based on the organizational setting of the firm. Then, in model 3 of 
table 5, we proceed similarly for the two periods of time we analyze. Again, we split the R&D 
stock according to whether the observation belongs to the earlier period of 2001 to 2006 or to 
the later period of 2007 to 2011. Model 3 in table 5 then presents all combinations of the three 
ownership types and the two periods of time which leaves us with an R&D stock split in six 
new variables. 
Model 3 of table 4 is the baseline model which we, for convenience, also display in 
table 5 (model 1). In model 2 the variable R&D stock is removed but replaced by a threefold 
split according to the ownership types. In other words, interaction effects of R&D stock and 
the three ownership types are included in the specification. The results show that the R&D 
stock of majority SOEs, minority SOEs, and POEs have significantly positive coefficients, 
which can be interpreted as elasticities. Yet, the elasticity of POEs’ R&D stock has the largest 
size (0.005 with p < 0.001) in comparison to the elasticity of majority SOEs (0.002 with p < 
0.05) and minority SOEs (0.004 with p < 0.001). This indicates that throughout the entire 
period of 2001 through 2011 those Chinese firms owned privately are most effective with 
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their R&D spending. To make the results more tangible, we also calculate returns to R&D.11 
For majority SOEs, minority SOEs and POEs they are 12.1%, 13.8%, and 15.8%, 
respectively. Given that the R&D intensity at POEs is higher than at SOEs (0.95% for POEs 
versus 0.72% for minority and 0.57% for majority SOEs) we conclude that POEs are actually 
more efficient in working with their R&D resources. The higher returns to R&D are not a 
reflection of starting from a lower level of R&D intensity.  
In model 3, we again split the R&D stock according to the time of observation. The 
R&D stock for those observations in the years 2001 through 2006 is positively significant and 
yields a coefficient of 0.003 (p < 0.001). The R&D stock in the period from 2007 to 2011 is 
also positive and significant but its coefficient is larger (0.006 with p < 0.001). This indicates 
that the effectiveness of R&D expenditures increases over time. Translating the elasticities 
into returns clearly reveals the progress that Chinese firms have made in benefitting from their 
investment into R&D. Returns to R&D increase from 9.3% in the early time period to 20.2% 
in the later one. In model 4, we not only split the R&D stock by ownership type or time but, 
rather, by both variables leading to six regressors. Here, we find that the POEs in the period 
from 2007 to 2011 show the highest effectiveness of their R&D (0.007 with p < 0.001) 
whereas the majority SOEs in the earlier period only show a marginally significant effect of 
their R&D (0.002 with p < 0.1). The difference in the coefficients of R&D over time is 
significant for minority SOEs and for POEs but not for majority SOEs. Furthermore, to 
investigate a diverging development of effectiveness over time, we test whether the difference 
in the coefficients is larger for POEs than for majority SOEs. As our test indicates a 
difference which is significant at the 10% level, we find that not only the effectiveness of 
R&D is increasing over time but, moreover, that the differences between ownership types are 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
 
 
 
 
11 To obtain returns we multiply the elasticities with the ratio “gross output/R&D stock” calculated at the mean 
of the corresponding variables. 
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increasing.12 Put differently, we find a diverging increase in the effectiveness of R&D for 
POEs compared with majority SOEs. 
6.2.2 Effectiveness of Patented Research Output 
Concerning patented research, we proceed in the similar way as denoted in table 5. Table 6 
presents various regression specifications where we split the patent stock according to 
ownership type, period of time, or both. The baseline model (model 1) of table 6 builds on the 
baseline model of table 5 with one addition: the variable patent stock is included in the model 
in addition to R&D stock and, with it, a dummy variable reflecting the fact that no patents 
could be found for this firm. The results of model 1 in table 6 show no major difference in 
comparison to model 1 of table 5. The coefficient of patent stock is positively significant 
(0.018 with p < 0.01) indicating that patents have an effect on productivity. Model 2 of table 5 
shows the elasticities for the patent stock segmented by ownership type, which are not 
significantly different from each other. The patent stock for majority SOE shows the largest 
coefficient among the ownership types (0.021 p < 0.01). The coefficient of minority SOEs is 
0.016 (p < 0.05) and the coefficient of POEs is 0.019 (p < 0.001). Concerning the 
development across time, we find in model 3 of table 5 that the coefficient of patent stock is 
0.032 (p < 0.001) for the earlier period and, statistically significantly lower, 0.015 (p < 0.01) 
for the later period. This indicates that the contribution of patent applications is decreasing 
over time. To the best of our knowledge, this research is the first presenting the implications 
from the Chinese patent explosion explicitly for the real economy. Whereas Li (2012) finds 
an increase in the number of patent filings for Chinese firms after the introduction of patent 
subsidies and Lei et al. (2013) complement this result by documenting that the increased 
number is achieved by filing narrower patents, our results directly relate patent filings to 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
 
 
 
 
12 This result cannot be explained by SOEs only remaining in sectors where R&D is of lesser importance such as 
mining and utilities. Even though the share of SOE in manufacturing is decreasing from 64% at the beginning of 
our sample period, it still stands at 38% at the end. Furthermore, we are controlling for the industry-specific 
importance of R&D via dummy variables. 
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productivity. When the patent stock is split into six categories allowing us to investigate the 
effect of patented research across ownership type and over time (model 4), we document a 
significantly positive effect on productivity for firms of all ownership types for the earlier 
period. Interestingly, for the later period, we find no significant effect for majority SOEs, 
whereas minority SOEs exhibit a positively significant coefficient of 0.013 (p < 0.05) and 
POEs show a higher coefficient of 0.018 which is also highly significant (p < 0.001). POEs 
are also the only ownership type that does not exhibit a statistically significant decline in the 
coefficient over time. Apparently, firms with a lower state ownership follow a commercially 
oriented but not policy-induced patenting strategy. 
6.2.3 Effectiveness of High-Quality Research 
In table 7, we investigate the effectiveness of high-quality research. Model 1 of table 7 builds 
on model 1 of table 6 but also includes two more variables: the average PCT citations 
collected by each patent family during a 3-year window and the high-tech share of patents. 
We find that average PCT citations have a positively significant effect on productivity (0.044 
with p < 0.001). Further, the high-tech share within the patent portfolio is also significant and 
positive (0.049 with p < 0.05). Model 2 of table 7 splits both variables according to their 
ownership type. Concerning average PCT citations, we only find the coefficient for POEs to 
be significant and positive (0.048 with p < 0.05). The same can be observed for the high-tech 
share: here, again, only the coefficient for POEs is significantly positive (0.063 with p < 
0.05). This indicates that only POEs are able to translate high-quality patents into higher 
productivity. Model 3 includes a split of both variables according to the period of time. Here, 
average PCT citations show a significantly positive coefficient – but only for the later period 
of 2007 to 2011 (0.045 with p < 0.05). We make the same observation for the high-tech share 
as this variable is also only significant for the later period (0.072 with p < 0.01). When 
accommodating both ownership type and period of time in the regression model (model 4), 
we find that only POEs in the later period show a significantly positive effect for both 
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variables, average PCT citations (0.051 with p < 0.01) and high-tech share (0.074 with p < 
0.01).13 Our results show POEs excel other firms in translating high-quality research into 
tangible outcomes. Whereas the descriptive statistics show R&D of lower quality for majority 
SOEs, minority SOEs achieve higher or comparable quality as POEs but apparently fail to 
translate their quality into productivity increases. 
6.2.4 Effectiveness of Research Collaborations 
For investigating the effectiveness of research collaborations, we include the patent stock of 
patents jointly filed with national and international co-applicants in the regression models. 
Table 8 presents these results in the same known way with splitting these two variables 
according to ownership type and time period of the observations. In the baseline model 
(model 1 of table 8), we find a weakly significant effect for patents jointly filed with national 
co-applicants (0.024 with p < 0.1) but no effect for patents filed with international co-
applicants. When splitting these two variables according to ownership type (model 2), jointly 
filed patents with national co-applicants only show a significant effect for POEs (0.023 with p 
< 0.1). Apparently, collaborations do drive productivity but only for POEs. When splitting 
these variables according to the time period (model 3), a significant effect can be found for 
patents filed with national co-applicants – but only in the later period from 2007 to 2011 (0.23 
with p < 0.1). Model 4 again includes the six variables for each type of collaboration. Here, 
we find a significant effect for POEs in the later period. The coefficient is positive and 
significant for collaborations with national co-applicants (0.026 with p < 0.05). Collaborations 
with international co-applicants do not show a significant effect.14 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
 
 
 
 
13 Minority SOEs show a marginally significant effect for high-tech share in the later time period (p < 0.1). 
14 An alternative way of broadening the knowledge base of the firm is to work with researchers of foreign 
nationality or with Chinese researchers based abroad. We checked whether these activities would increase firm 
productivity but found a significant negative effect for POEs, for the later time period, and for POEs in the later 
time period. It seems that POEs started to invest in this mechanism but that up to now costs are higher than 
benefits. 
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The positive effect for national collaborations for POEs suggests that private firms are 
able to absorb knowledge from the outside. To improve our understanding of R&D 
collaborations, we scrutinize the collaboration partners and divide those according to their 
type. We were surprised to find that collaborations with firms, universities, and research 
institutes were all insignificant. This is consistent with prior survey evidence for ICT firms 
which has shown that collaborations with universities are not only still quite infrequent but 
are further rarely the source of core technology for firms (Wu & Zhou, 2012). Only 
collaborations with individuals exhibit a positively significant effect. Based on discussions 
with practitioners familiar with Chinese patent filing strategies, we were able to identify two 
categories of collaborations with individuals. First, it is possible that the individual is a 
manager or an employee of the firm. The invention might be additionally assigned to an 
individual to give specific honors to the employee or in order to retain the property right even 
if the firm would go into bankruptcy. In both cases, it could be an indication that the invention 
is especially valuable but it would not be a true collaboration because firm boundaries are not 
crossed. Second, the person can be a self-employed inventor or a consultant working for firms 
on a contractual basis. Only these cases should be classified as true collaborations. 
Unfortunately, we cannot differentiate between these two cases as we do not have access to 
the names of employees. 
It is possible that we do not find an influence of collaboration for large firms because 
the variety of their activities blurs an unambiguous effect. We therefore investigated the result 
for individual national collaboration partners separately for firms below and above the median 
number of employees. However, these results confirmed our findings of the overall sample. 
Importantly, when splitting the sample according to different measures of absorptive capacity, 
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we never find a significant positive effect for collaborations with other firms, universities, or 
research institutes.15  
From the overall view on our results we have to conclude that in the Chinese 
innovation system most collaborations do not enable the firms to increase their productivity. 
In the past, firms pretended to have collaborations with organizations such as universities or 
research institutes. A survey of Chinese manufacturers found that more than half of the firms 
enter into collaborations for the primary reason of accessing government funds. Product 
development and technology transfer are only of secondary importance. Rather, firms and 
organizations divide government funds without true R&D collaborations (EAC, 2014).  
6.3 Robustness Checks 
Endogeneity of the variables is a major concern in any study estimating the productivity 
effects of R&D activities. We choose the control function approach developed by Levinsohn 
& Petrin (2003) as the method fitting best for the setting for our main analysis. However, we 
were concerned whether our results are robust concerning the use of other methods. In table 9, 
we therefore report summary results for the use of alternative approaches. As a first 
robustness check, we use the approach by LP but lag all R&D-related variables by one year to 
drive a wedge between the decision on R&D and the realization of output (panel A). Next, we 
employed the approach by Olley & Pakes (1996) with concurrent (panel B) and lagged R&D-
related variables (panel C). Furthermore, we tried our best to find a system GMM 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
 
 
 
 
15 We broadened our investigations of collaborations by considering the dimensions of quality, geographical 
proximity, and organizational integration. In order to analyze whether we would get an effect by looking at 
institutions of especially high quality, we separated out universities participating in the 985 program and 
research institutes belonging to CAS but collaborations with neither group showed a positive significant effect 
on TFP. We tested whether geographical proximity would facilitate knowledge transfer by looking separately at 
collaborations with universities located in the same city as the headquarter of the firm. Again, we found no 
significant effect. Finally, we tried to investigate the influence of having a co-applicant that is a joint venture 
partner at the same time. Because joint ventures offer a closer form of collaboration due to the organizational 
integration of researchers, we expected a positive effect for this collaboration form. However, we found only six 
firms with this specific type of co-applications and furthermore, only for two firms the joint venture partner was 
from outside the group structure of the focal firm. Due to these rare occasions we were not able to run a 
regression analysis but we learned that this type of activity is not common. 
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specification that does not violate the requirement concerning the autocorrelation of the error 
term and which passes the test for over-identifying restrictions for the instruments. In our 
preferred specification, we use input factors concurrently without additionally controlling for 
further lags in the input factors or including a lagged dependent variable. We treat the input 
factors as endogenous and the R&D variables as predetermined. Whereas this specification 
always passes the test of over-identifying restrictions at the 5% level, we were not able to find 
a specification which passes the test for no autocorrelation of second order (panel D). Given 
this limitation, the results from system GMM should be interpreted cautiously. 
Our results do not show major differences are thus mainly confirmed by the different 
methods. Panels A-D reveal that no other ownership type has a higher coefficient for R&D 
stock than POEs. Also, all four methods indicate higher returns to R&D for the later period of 
time. The reverse pattern for the patent stock is also confirmed by panel A-D, as elasticities of 
patenting have decreased over time. The control function approaches of panel A-C tend to 
confirm our findings with respect to the productivity effect of high-quality research. Higher 
average citations and a higher share of high-tech patents increase productivity for POEs and 
have a positive effect in the later time period. System GMM always exhibits positive 
coefficients but at differing degrees of significance. One reason for this deviation could be 
that our data does not fully comply with the requirements of this method. Finally, results 
concerning collaborations are confirmed by OP in panel B. The other methods tend to 
corroborate the positive coefficients for national collaborations and the negative ones for 
international collaborations but with partially differing significance levels. 
7 Implications 
Our study yields three main implications for our understanding of innovation activities in 
Chinese firms. From these implications, we are in turn able to derive important policy 
implications. 
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First, we observe a strong divergence in the influence R&D activities have on 
productivity according to ownership type. POEs generally yield higher benefits from R&D 
efforts and thus outperform SOEs. This is not only true in the earlier period (2001-2006) but 
POEs can even increase their advantage in exploiting their R&D activities over time. The 
group of POEs consists of privatized SOEs and newly founded private firms. POEs were 
much more exposed to competition than the remaining (earlier established) SOEs as the latter 
had preferential access to resources such as capital and enjoyed protected markets. This 
unequally competitive environment gave POEs strong incentives to implement business 
strategies guided by market needs. They learned how to better allocate resources – increasing 
their performance over time. An alternative explanation for our finding could be the selection 
of especially productive firms for privatization. Unfortunately, the literature does so far not 
provide evidence on the prior efficiency of firms selected for privatization. Our results show 
that the transformation from a firm population with many SOEs to a population with more 
POEs has been a successful transition policy for China. An important policy implication of 
our research is therefore that market forces can be relied upon to increase the effectiveness of 
R&D.  
Second, the strongly increasing amount of patent applications does not directly 
translate into increasing productivity. Patented R&D efforts do drive productivity but as 
patent filings increase, the productivity impact of new patent applications decreases strongly 
or even vanishes. The returns to patenting may decrease due to policy measures that reward 
quantity over quality. Widespread patent subsidies have now led to a drastic inflation in 
patent filings (Li 2012). With majority SOEs, the development has gone so far that patent 
applications have become disconnected from the productivity development. As patent 
applications require resources for examination and a plethora of applications makes the 
system less transparent, the government might want to shift the focus of its innovation policy 
from quantity to quality of applications. Now that organizations in China have learnt how to 
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deal with and use intellectual property rights, firms and universities need a more nuanced 
approach to decide which inventions are “worth to file”. The subsidies and policy targets of 
the past biased these decisions in the direction of quantity. 
Third, Chinese firms still face limitations with regard to technology transfer and 
absorbing knowledge. China’s policies strongly emphasized the learning of and the 
knowledge transfer to domestic organizations. However, Chinese firms still have difficulties 
in absorbing knowledge. Our results show very limited benefits from R&D collaborations. 
One solution could be that government programs encourage and require “real” R&D 
collaborations between partners beyond the sharing of subsidies. Providing the right 
incentives to universities and research institutes to engage in technology transfer and to enter 
in R&D collaborations could complement this policy. Additionally, increasing market 
pressure could force firms into mutually beneficial R&D collaborations with the aims of 
reducing development costs and gaining competitive advantage.  
8 Summary and Future Avenues for Research 
This study investigates the effect of different R&D activities on TFP of publicly listed 
Chinese firms for the time period 2001-2011. We focus on the influence of ownership 
structure and investigate dynamics by taking two time periods into account. When analyzing 
the benefits of investments in R&D, important differences become apparent. Specifically, we 
find that POEs benefit most from R&D investments. Furthermore, only POEs benefit from 
sophisticated R&D efforts (i.e., highly cited patented research, research in high-tech). This is 
good news given the steadily increasing importance of POEs. Concerning the development 
over time, Chinese firms of all ownership types achieve higher returns on R&D investments 
in later periods, which may be a reflection of an increasingly efficient allocation of R&D 
resources in the Chinese corporate sector. But our results also show that the strongly rising 
number of patent filings does not materialize per se in higher productivity. Precisely, as more 
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patents are filed, their effectiveness diminishes or even vanishes. Further, up to now there are 
limited benefits arising from R&D collaborations: only domestic collaborations with 
individuals show a positive influence on productivity. 
There are various avenues for future research. An important research question to be 
answered is investigating the underlying mechanisms of the superior R&D performance of 
POEs. Do POEs excel other firms due to higher levels of competition, due to differences in 
the quality of the firm management, or due to less governmental influence on firm strategies? 
In addition, it would be worthwhile to investigate whether privatization is leading to higher 
efficiency or whether it is the other way round. Taking into account the economic 
implications of state ownership, future inquiry should thus investigate the transformation and 
performance of different organizational forms of Chinese firms. 
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Tables and Figures 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics - firm characteristics according to ownership category 
  Total Majority SOE  Minority SOE  POE  
100.0% 18.4% 34.0% 47.6% 
12,443 2,283 4,236 5,924 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Labor (number of employees) 4,687 18,490 9 552,810 8,298 32,155 4,078 14,346 3,730 12,903 
Gross output (million RMB) 4,404 37,118 3 1,633,479 9,181 55,105 3,321 27,316 3,336 34,350 
Value added (million RMB) 1,216 10,945 0.5 602,143 2,719 20,850 935 8,291 854 6,115 
Capital (million RMB) 1,820 13,530 0.5 465,724 3,979 21,154 1,468 9,523 1,239 12,045 
Material (million RMB) 3,177 30,049 0.5 1,706,566 6,465 40,210 2,371 19,264 2,487 31,677 
R&D expenditures (million RMB) 32.785 269.031 0 11,166 52.467 489.449 23.900 155.218 31.552 205.687 
R&D stock (million RMB) 76.628 568.300 0 21,253 82.421 665.667 63.701 452.756 83.639 600.797 
No R&D (dummy) 0.524 0 1 0.662 0.591 0.422 
Patent applications 7.456 103.431 0 5,937 5.476 29.703 6.942 86.320 8.586 129.622 
Patent stock 20.188 317.200 0 18,812 11.731 65.958 16.432 161.466 26.134 436.997 
No patents (dummy) 0.460 0 1 0.567 0.486 0.400 
Average PCT citations (3 years) # 0.053 0.206 0 7 0.033 0.110 0.051 0.236 0.059 0.206 
High-tech share of patents (%) # 0.182 0.296 0 1 0.145 0.279 0.188 0.302 0.188 0.297 
National coapplications # 4.198 137.346 0 7,869 0.617 3.528 1.656 23.796 6.752 187.917 
International coapplications # 0.258 3.155 0 89 0.231 1.913 0.429 4.344 0.161 2.492 
Policy zone (dummy) 0.152  0 1 0.134  0.151  0.157  
FDI encouraged (dummy) 0.580  0 1 0.489  0.547  0.625  
Regional GDP/capita (RMB) 47,210 19,966 1,351 276,553 40,671 18,136 45,012 18,868 50,375 20,482 
Notes: The statistics are calculated for the overall sample of 1,927 firms (12,443 observations. #Calculation for 1,385 firms with at least one patent application (6,717 observations). SOE = 
state-owned enterprise. POE = privately owned enterprise. 
 
 
  
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics - firm characteristics according to time period 
   2001-2006  2007-2011 
44.9% 55.1% 
5,586 6,857 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Labor (number of employees) 3,827 13,848 5,388 21,521 
Gross output (million RMB) 2,807 23,903 5,705 45,067 
Value added (million RMB) 884 8,644 1,487 12,506 
Capital (million RMB) 1,367 10,123 2,188 15,762 
Material (million RMB) 1,903 17,283 4,216 37,322 
R&D expenditure (million RMB) 14.216 269.453 47.911 267.755 
R&D stock (million RMB) 15.942 104.733 126.066 756.124 
No R&D (dummy) 0.741 0.346 
Patent applications 2.899 39.127 11.168  134.671 
Patent stock 6.168 72.589 31.610 421.914 
No patents (dummy) 0.625 0.326 
Average PCT citations (3 years) # 0.037 0.198 0.060 0.209 
High-tech share of patents (%) # 0.177 0.312 0.183 0.289 
National coapplications # 0.935 13.757 5.675 165.262 
International coapplications # 0.233 2.151 0.269 3.516 
Majority SOE (dummy) 0.300  0.078  
Minority SOE (dummy) 0.377  0.300  
POE (dummy) 0.323  0.622  
Policy zone (dummy) 0.142  0.156  
FDI encouraged (dummy) 0.480  0.625  
Regional GDP/capita (RMB) 38,277 16,664 51,253 20,025 
Notes: The statistics are calculated for the overall sample of 1,927 firms (12,443 observations. #Calculation for 1,385 firms 
with at least one patent application (6,717 observations). SOE = state-owned enterprise. POE = privately owned enterprise. 
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Table 3: Industry composition 
Industry Code  No. firms % 
Agriculture A  47 2.44 
Mining B  40 2.08 
Manufacturing: food & beverages C0  88 4.57 
Manufacturing: textiles & apparel C1  93 4.83 
Manufacturing: wood & furniture C2  11 0.57 
Manufacturing: paper & printing C3  49 2.54 
Manufacturing: petro-chemistry & plastics C4  268 13.91 
Manufacturing: electronics C5  114 5.92 
Manufacturing: metal & non-metals C6  216 11.21 
Manufacturing: machinery & instruments C7  477 24.75 
Manufacturing: pharma & biological products C8  127 6.59 
Manufacturing: other C9  20 1.04 
Utilities D  57 2.96 
Construction E  43 2.23 
Information Technology G  142 7.37 
Social Services K  56 2.91 
Communication and Culture L  15 0.78 
Conglomerates M  64 3.32 
Total   1,927 100 
Note: The industries are specified according to the classification of the China Securities Regulatory Commission. 
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Table 4: Basic production functions 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Method OLS LP OP OLS LP OP 
Dependent variable Ln (gross output) 
Ln (gross 
output) 
Ln (gross 
output) 
Ln (value 
added) 
Ln (value 
added) 
Ln (value 
added) 
Ln (labor) 0.094*** 0.100*** 0.087*** 0.392*** 0.269*** 0.347*** 
(0.007) (0.005) (0.006) (0.016) (0.015) (0.014) 
Ln (capital) 0.123*** 0.279*** 0.055*** 0.462*** 0.379*** 0.250*** 
(0.007) (0.046) (0.010) (0.014) (0.024) (0.024) 
Ln (material) 0.717*** 0.591*** 0.703***    
(0.007) (0.043) (0.007)    
Ln (R&D stock) 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.003** 0.014*** 0.010*** 0.011*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
No R&D 0.000 -0.008 0.001 0.010 -0.024 0.013 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.032) (0.032) (0.027) 
Minority SOE -0.048*** -0.043*** -0.041*** -0.118*** -0.076** -0.099*** 
(0.012) (0.012) (0.010) (0.031) (0.025) (0.027) 
POE -0.036** -0.028* -0.035** -0.123*** -0.048+ -0.118*** 
(0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.034) (0.026) (0.029) 
Policy zone 0.021 0.026+ 0.013 0.082* 0.073* 0.055 
(0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.039) (0.032) (0.040) 
FDI encouraged -0.061*** -0.041*** -0.065*** -0.167*** -0.094*** -0.171*** 
(0.010) (0.011) (0.009) (0.023) (0.021) (0.022) 
Regional GDP/capita 0.024* 0.017 0.024* 0.101*** 0.046* 0.097** 
(0.011) (0.013) (0.011) (0.027) (0.022) (0.028) 
Constant 2.872***   6.433***   
  (0.147)     (0.338)     
Returns to scale (RTS) 0.934 0.970 0.845 0.854 0.648 0.597 
Test constant RTS, χ²(3) / χ²(2) 175.20*** 3.15+ 180.47*** 156.84*** 223.09*** 269.33*** 
(p-value) (0.000) (0.076) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
N 12,443 12,443 12,428 12,782 12,782 12,751 
Firms 1,927 1,927 1,927 1,969 1,969 1,969 
R² 0.966   0.763   
Notes: All regressions contain industry, province, and year dummies. Reference category: majority SOE. Concerning OLS 
estimation: standard errors are clustered by firm. The standard errors of Olley & Pakes (1996) estimations are calculated by 
bootstrapping with 50 replications. +, *, **, *** indicate significance levels of 10, 5, 1, and 0.1 percent, respectively. SOE = 
state-owned enterprise. POE = privately owned enterprise.  
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Table 5: Effectiveness of R&D 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Ln (labor) 0.100*** 0.099*** 0.099*** 0.099*** 
(0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) 
Ln (capital) 0.279*** 0.286*** 0.229*** 0.260*** 
(0.046) (0.044) (0.041) (0.040) 
Ln (material) 0.591*** 0.583*** 0.626*** 0.602*** 
(0.043) (0.049) (0.038) (0.041) 
Ln (R&D stock) 0.004*** 
(0.001) 
       x Majority SOE 0.002* 
(0.001) 
       x Minority SOE 0.004*** 
(0.001) 
       x POE 0.005*** 
(0.001) 
       x 2001-2006 0.003*** 
(0.001) 
       x 2007-2011 0.006*** 
(0.001) 
       x Majority SOE x 2001-2006 0.002+ 
(0.001) 
       x Majority SOE x 2007-2011 0.004** 
(0.001) 
       x Minority SOE x 2001-2006 0.003** 
(0.001) 
       x Minority SOE x 2007-2011 0.005*** 
(0.001) 
       x POE x 2001-2006 0.003* 
(0.001) 
       x POE x 2007-2011 0.007*** 
(0.001) 
No R&D -0.008 -0.007 -0.010 -0.009 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) 
Minority SOE -0.043*** -0.056*** -0.043*** -0.053*** 
(0.012) (0.014) (0.011) (0.015) 
POE -0.028* -0.056** -0.030* -0.050** 
(0.012) (0.018) (0.012) (0.018) 
Policy zone 0.026 0.026 0.025 0.025 
(0.014) (0.018) (0.019) (0.015) 
FDI encouraged -0.041*** -0.042*** -0.042*** -0.042*** 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.008) (0.008) 
Regional GDP/capita 0.017 0.018 0.017 0.018+ 
  (0.013) (0.012) (0.011) (0.010) 
Notes: Levinsohn & Petrin (2003) estimation with ln(gross output) as dependent variable. All regressions contain industry, 
province, and year dummies. Reference category: majority SOE. +, *, **, *** indicate significance levels of 10, 5, 1, and 0.1 
percent, respectively. SOE = state-owned enterprise. POE = privately owned enterprise. The statistics are calculated for the 
12,443 observations of the 1,927 firms. 
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Table 6: Effectiveness of patented research 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Ln (labor) 0.097*** 0.097*** 0.097*** 0.097*** 
(0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) 
Ln (capital) 0.298*** 0.298*** 0.294*** 0.299*** 
(0.052) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) 
Ln (material) 0.557*** 0.557*** 0.562*** 0.558*** 
(0.054) (0.046) (0.048) (0.048) 
ln (R&D stock) 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
No R&D -0.006 -0.006 -0.007 -0.007 
(0.010) (0.014) (0.012) (0.014) 
Ln (patent stock) 0.018** 
(0.006) 
       x Majority SOE 0.021** 
(0.007) 
       x Minority SOE 0.016* 
(0.006) 
       x POE 0.019*** 
(0.005) 
       x 2001-2006 0.032*** 
(0.007) 
       x 2007-2011 0.015** 
(0.005) 
       x Majority SOE x 2001-2006 0.036*** 
(0.008) 
       x Majority SOE x 2007-2011 0.007 
(0.008) 
       x Minority SOE x 2001-2006 0.027** 
(0.008) 
       x Minority SOE x 2007-2011 0.013* 
(0.006) 
       x POE x 2001-2006 0.032** 
(0.010) 
       x POE x 2007-2011 0.018*** 
(0.005) 
No patents -0.019+ -0.019 -0.012 -0.013 
(0.011) (0.012) (0.014) (0.013) 
Minority SOE -0.046*** -0.041** -0.045*** -0.043** 
(0.010) (0.012) (0.011) (0.013) 
POE -0.031* -0.029* -0.030** -0.034* 
(0.012) (0.014) (0.011) (0.014) 
Policy zone 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 
(0.012) (0.014) (0.017) (0.013) 
FDI encouraged -0.041*** -0.041*** -0.041*** -0.041*** 
(0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.009) 
Regional GDP/capita 0.015 0.015 0.014 0.014 
  (0.009) (0.012) (0.012) (0.010) 
Notes: Levinsohn & Petrin (2003) estimation with ln(gross output) as dependent variable. All regressions contain industry, 
province, and year dummies. Reference category: majority SOE. +, *, **, *** indicate significance levels of 10, 5, 1, and 0.1 
percent, respectively. SOE = state-owned enterprise. POE = privately owned enterprise. The statistics are calculated for the 
12,443 observations of the 1,927 firms. 
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Table 7: Effectiveness of high-quality research 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Ln (labor) 0.097*** 0.097*** 0.097*** 0.097*** 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Ln (capital) 0.294*** 0.294*** 0.293*** 0.292*** 
(0.041) (0.045) (0.041) (0.045) 
Ln (material) 0.563*** 0.562*** 0.563*** 0.565*** 
(0.096) (0.046) (0.040) (0.076) 
ln (R&D stock) 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
No R&D -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 
(0.015) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) 
Ln (patent stock) 0.017** 0.017*** 0.016** 0.016** 
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
No patents -0.010 -0.010 -0.012 -0.012 
(0.013) (0.010) (0.013) (0.013) 
Average PCT citations 0.044*** 
(0.012) 
       x Majority SOE 0.135 
(0.100) 
       x Minority SOE 0.032 
(0.027) 
       x POE 0.048* 
(0.020) 
       x 2001-2006 0.039 
(0.029) 
       x 2007-2011 0.045* 
(0.019) 
       x Majority SOE x 2001-2006 0.058 
(0.058) 
       x Majority SOE x 2007-2011 0.315 
(0.241) 
       x Minority SOE x 2001-2006 0.044 
(0.066) 
       x Minority SOE x 2007-2011 0.019 
(0.035) 
       x POE x 2001-2006 0.005 
(0.048) 
       x POE x 2007-2011 0.051** 
(0.019) 
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Table 7: Effectiveness of high-quality research (continued) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
High-tech share of patents 0.049* 
(0.021) 
       x Majority SOE -0.024 
(0.042) 
       x Minority SOE 0.054 
(0.034) 
       x POE 0.063* 
(0.027) 
       x 2001-2006 0.009 
(0.025) 
       x 2007-2011 0.072** 
(0.026) 
       x Majority SOE x 2001-2006 -0.051 
(0.055) 
       x Majority SOE x 2007-2011 0.029 
(0.073) 
       x Minority SOE x 2001-2006 0.031 
(0.037) 
       x Minority SOE x 2007-2011 0.071+ 
(0.040) 
       x POE x 2001-2006 0.028 
(0.043) 
       x POE x 2007-2011 0.074** 
(0.024) 
Minority SOE -0.046*** -0.050*** -0.046** -0.048*** 
(0.009) (0.011) (0.014) (0.011) 
POE -0.031** -0.036** -0.030* -0.033** 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) 
Policy zone 0.018 0.019 0.018 0.018 
(0.015) (0.014) (0.013) (0.016) 
FDI encouraged -0.041*** -0.041*** -0.040*** -0.041*** 
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Regional GDP/capita 0.014 0.014 0.014+ 0.014 
  (0.011) (0.012) (0.008) (0.012) 
Notes: Levinsohn & Petrin (2003) estimation with ln(gross output) as dependent variable. All regressions contain industry, 
province, and year dummies. Reference category: majority SOE. +, *, **, *** indicate significance levels of 10, 5, 1, and 0.1 
percent, respectively. SOE = state-owned enterprise. POE = privately owned enterprise. The statistics are calculated for the 
12,443 observations of the 1,927 firms. 
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Table 8: Effectiveness of research collaborations 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Ln (labor) 0.097*** 0.097*** 0.098*** 0.097*** 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) 
Ln (capital) 0.300*** 0.301*** 0.300*** 0.300*** 
(0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.053) 
Ln (material) 0.553*** 0.553*** 0.553*** 0.554*** 
(0.044) (0.049) (0.045) (0.060) 
ln (R&D stock) 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
No R&D -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 
(0.012) (0.012) (0.010) (0.012) 
Ln (patent stock) 0.013* 0.013* 0.013* 0.013* 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) 
No patents -0.024+ -0.024* -0.023+ -0.023+ 
(0.013) (0.012) (0.014) (0.013) 
Ln (national coapplications) 0.024+ 0.034 
(0.013) (0.041) 
       x Majority SOE 0.026 
(0.030) 
       x Minority SOE 0.026 
(0.026) 
       x POE 0.023+ 
(0.013) 
       x 2001-2006 0.033 
(0.023) 
       x 2007-2011 0.023+ 
(0.012) 
       x Majority SOE x 2001-2006 0.034 
(0.041) 
       x Majority SOE x 2007-2011 0.018 
(0.028) 
       x Minority SOE x 2001-2006 0.055 
(0.034) 
       x Minority SOE x 2007-2011 0.015 
(0.018) 
       x POE x 2001-2006 0.014 
(0.028) 
       x POE x 2007-2011 0.026* 
(0.012) 
 50
Table 8: Effectiveness of research collaborations (continued) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Ln (international coapplications) -0.020 
(0.029) 
       x Majority SOE -0.016 
(0.041) 
       x Minority SOE -0.025 
(0.033) 
       x POE -0.016 
(0.031) 
       x 2001-2006 -0.003 
(0.036) 
       x 2007-2011 -0.031 
(0.026) 
       x Majority SOE x 2001-2006 -0.035 
(0.089) 
       x Majority SOE x 2007-2011 0.007 
(0.122) 
       x Minority SOE x 2001-2006 -0.022 
(0.032) 
       x Minority SOE x 2007-2011 -0.028 
(0.044) 
       x POE x 2001-2006 0.057 
(0.088) 
       x POE x 2007-2011 -0.040 
(0.030) 
Minority SOE -0.046*** -0.046*** -0.046*** -0.046*** 
(0.008) (0.010) (0.011) (0.012) 
POE -0.031** -0.031* -0.031** -0.032* 
(0.010) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) 
Policy zone 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.021 
(0.015) (0.016) (0.014) (0.014) 
FDI encouraged -0.041*** -0.041*** -0.041*** -0.042*** 
(0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) 
Regional GDP/capita 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.014 
  (0.010) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010) 
Notes: Levinsohn & Petrin (2003) estimation with ln(gross output) as dependent variable. All regressions contain industry, 
province, and year dummies. Reference category: majority SOE. +, *, **, *** indicate significance levels of 10, 5, 1, and 0.1 
percent, respectively. SOE = state-owned enterprise. POE = privately owned enterprise. The statistics are calculated for the 
12,443 observations of the 1,927 firms. 
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Table 9: Overview of results for alternative estimation approaches 
Panel A: Levinsohn & Petrin (lags) 
 Ownership breakdown  Time breakdown 
 
Majority 
SOE 
Minority 
SOE POE  2001-2006 2007-2011 
(1)   Ln (R&D stock) 0.001 0.003* 0.005***  0.002* 0.005*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) 
(2)   Ln (patent stock) 0.017* 0.016** 0.026***  0.027*** 0.017*** 
(0.008) (0.006) (0.006)  (0.007) (0.005) 
(3)   Average PCT citations 0.045 0.030 0.071+  0.029 0.052* 
         (0.087) (0.020) (0.038)  (0.029) (0.026) 
        High-tech share of patents 0.006 0.039 0.060*  0.011 0.074* 
         (0.042) (0.033) (0.030)  (0.029) (0.029) 
(4)   Ln (national coapplications) 0.003 0.026 0.010  0.023 0.012 
         (0.027) (0.029) (0.018)  (0.022) (0.015) 
        Ln (international coapplications) 0.001 -0.036 0.005  -0.006 -0.026 
         (0.051) (0.045) (0.049)  (0.031) (0.033) 
10,667 observations – 1,674 firms 
 
 
Panel B: Olley and Pakes 
 Ownership breakdown  Time breakdown 
 
Majority 
SOE 
Minority 
SOE POE  2001-2006 2007-2011 
(1)   Ln (R&D stock) 0.002 0.003* 0.003***  0.002** 0.003** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) 
(2)   Ln (patent stock) 0.025** 0.021** 0.027***  0.037*** 0.023*** 
(0.008) (0.007) (0.005)  (0.008) (0.005) 
(3)   Average PCT citations 0.092 0.024 0.049*  0.033 0.042* 
         (0.077) (0.024) (0.023)  (0.028) (0.019) 
        High-tech share of patents -0.007 0.061* 0.065**  0.027 0.070** 
         (0.044) (0.030) (0.024)  (0.027) (0.024) 
(4)   Ln (national coapplications) 0.014 0.025 0.021+  0.029 0.021+ 
         (0.026) (0.199) (0.013)  (0.023) (0.012) 
        Ln (international coapplications) -0.019 -0.010 -0.003  0.003 -0.017 
         (0.051) (0.050) (0.037)  (0.037) (0.034) 
12,428 observations – 1,927 firms 
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Table 9: Overview of results for alternative estimation approaches (continued) 
Panel C: Olley and Pakes (lags) 
 Ownership breakdown  Time breakdown 
 
Majority 
SOE 
Minority 
SOE POE 
 
2001-2006 2007-2011 
(1)   Ln (R&D stock) 0.0005 0.002+ 0.003**  0.002* 0.003* 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) 
(2)   Ln (patent stock) 0.020* 0.022** 0.035***  0.035*** 0.023*** 
(0.009) (0.008) (0.007)  (0.007) (0.007) 
(3)   Average PCT citations -0.014 0.028 0.071  0.028 0.040 
         (0.080) (0.022) (0.044)  (0.037) (0.027) 
        High-tech share of patents 0.031 0.052 0.063**  0.030 0.075** 
         (0.052) (0.033) (0.024)  (0.028) (0.027) 
(4)   Ln (national coapplications) -0.009 0.025 0.012  0.024 0.011 
         (0.031) (0.026) (0.016)  (0.025) (0.016) 
        Ln (international coapplications) -0.004 -0.024 0.016  -0.004 -0.015 
         (0.047) (0.048) (0.040)  (0.034) (0.039) 
10,653 observations – 1,674 firms 
 
 
Panel D: System-GMM 
 Ownership breakdown  Time breakdown 
 
Majority 
SOE 
Minority 
SOE POE 
 
2001-2006 2007-2011 
(1)   Ln (R&D stock) 0.0005 0.003* 0.003*  0.002* 0.007*** 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002)  (0.001) (0.002) 
(2)   Ln (patent stock) 0.050*** 0.027*** 0.021***  0.037*** 0.025*** 
(0.011) (0.008) (0.007)  (0.009) (0.007) 
(3)   Average PCT citations 0.130 0.026 0.035  0.035+ 0.046+ 
         (0.112) (0.020) (0.047)  (0.021) (0.025) 
        High-tech share of patents 0.010 0.018 0.011  0.001 0.036 
         (0.059) (0.038) (0.041)  (0.035) (0.032) 
(4)   Ln (national coapplications) 0.074** 0.032 0.030*  0.055* 0.041** 
         (0.028) (0.024) (0.015)  (0.024) (0.014) 
        Ln (international coapplications) -0.057 0.014 -0.011  -0.043 -0.016 
         (0.037) (0.025) (0.030)  (0.035) (0.028) 
12,443 observations – 1,927 firms 
Notes: Panels A to D are each showing abbreviated results from eight regression results with ln(gross output) as dependent 
variable. For the mentioned specifications (1) to (4) separate regressions were run for the ownership and the time breakdown. 
Only the coefficients of the broken down R&D activities are shown in this table. All regressions contain the full set of 
variables mentioned in Table 4. +, *, **, *** indicate significance levels of 10, 5, 1 and 0.1 percent, respectively. SOE = 
state-owned enterprise. POE = privately owned enterprise. 
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Figure 1: Development of R&D expenditures and patenting 
 
Sources: Data for R&D expenditures taken from China’s Statistical Yearbooks on Science and Technology; data for patent 
applications taken from China’s State Intellectual Property Office. 
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Figure 2: Firm locations in 2001 
 
Source: Data of the authors. 
 
Figure 3: Firm locations in 2011 
 
Source: Data of the authors.
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Appendix A: Matching Procedure 
When matching the patent information to the firm data, one has to take care of several 
complications to arrive at appropriate corporate patent portfolios. We derive various variants 
of the firm name to obtain potential matches which are then manually checked.  
Our name patterns take the following issues into account: first, spelling errors or 
systematic abbreviations might occur in the names of the patent owners. Second, the patent 
law allows Chinese patent applicants to use their Chinese name in Chinese characters, their 
Chinese name in Pinyin format, their English firm name, or any combination thereof. 
PATSTAT converts the name into Pinyin format if the firm has originally used Chinese 
characters in its applicant name. We therefore constructed several name patterns for the 
matching process in order to reconcile complete patent portfolios. For example, the firm 
“China International Marine Containers” files patents under its full English name but also 
under the abbreviations “CIMC” or “China Int Marine Containers” and under the Pinyin 
formats “Zhongguo Guoji Haiyun Jizhuangxiang” and “Zhong Ji Jituan”. Third, we included 
a list of historic firm names to take care of name changes. With the approach described above, 
we compiled all possible variations of firm names and compiled all their patent applications 
on the aggregate firm level (i.e., the ultimate owner).  
This approach allowed us to aggregate consistent firm level patent portfolios even if 
firms are large conglomerates consisting of multiple legal entities with varying names. 
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Appendix B: Variable Definitions 
Table B1: Variable Definitions and Data Sources  
 
Variable Definition 
Production function  
Gross output Total revenue in million RMB deflated to 2005 prices with an 
industry-specific (2-digit level) deflator for value added. Data 
sources: Compustat for accounting information, National Bureau 
of Statistics for deflators. 
Value added Value added in million RMB deflated to 2005 prices. Calculated 
as deflated revenue minus the difference of deflated costs of goods 
sold and labor costs. Costs of goods sold and labor costs are 
deflated using the producer price index. Data sources: Compustat 
for accounting information, National Bureau of Statistics for 
deflators. 
Labor  Number of employees is used as measurement for the input factor 
labor. Data source: Datastream.  
Capital Property, plant and equipment in million RMB deflated to 2005 
prices is used as measurement for the input factor capital (net 
fixed assets). Adjusted for inflation by a fixed assets deflator. Data 
sources: Compustat for accounting information, National Bureau 
of Statistics for deflators. 
Material  Material costs in million RMB deflated to 2005 prices. Calculated 
as difference of deflated costs of goods sold and labor costs. Data 
source: Compustat. 
R&D stock Stock of R&D expenditures in million RMB deflated to 2005 
prices. Accumulated over the period 2001-2011 computed with 
the recurring balance formula applying a depreciation rate of 15% 
and a growth rate of 8% before the first observation. Data sources: 
Accounting information from annual reports for 2001-2006, 
WIND for 2007-2011; National Bureau of Statistics for deflators. 
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Patent stock Stock of invention patent families in a firm’s portfolio. All patent 
families are counted by the year of their earliest application 
(priority). They are accumulated from the founding of the firm 
until 2011. We apply an annual depreciation rate of 15%. Data 
source: PATSTAT April 2013. 
Average PCT citations Number of citations received from PCT applications in a 3-year 
time window divided by patent stock. Both citations and patent 
stock are depreciated with an annual rate of 15%. Data source: 
PATSTAT April 2013. 
High-tech share of patents Share of patents in the patent stock that have at least one 
technology class listed in the classification by EUROSTAT as 
belonging to the high-tech sector. 
National coapplications Number of patent families that list a second applicant from within 
China. Co-applicants belonging to the same group as the focal 
firm are excluded. Data source: PATSTAT April 2013. 
International coapplications Number of patent families that list a second applicant from 
without China. Co-applicants belonging to the same group as the 
focal firm are excluded. Data source: PATSTAT April 2013. 
Ownership type 
 
Time variant dummy variables controlling for ownership status:  
 Privately-owned without state holding (POE). 
 State-owned with the state holding more than 50% of the 
shares (majority SOE). 
 State-owned with the state holding a less than 50% but more 
than 0% of the shares (minority SOE). 
Data source: RESSET. 
  
Operational environment  
Policy zone Time variant dummy variable which equals 1 if the firm’s 
headquarter is located either in a Science & technology industrial 
park (STIP) or in an Economic & technology development zone 
(ETDZ). The allocation is based on a comparison of the 6-digit 
postcode of the firm’s headquarter with the 6-digit postcode of the 
zone. Data source: Local Governments. 
In the time period 1998-2010 the Central Government recognized 
82 STIPs with the aim to generate technology spillovers between 
indigenous firms and 113 ETDZs with the aim to foster 
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internationalization strategies of firms. 
See Liu & Wu (2011) for entry conditions and preferential 
treatment of firms located in these zones. 
Foreign direct investment 
(FDI) encouraged 
A time variant dummy variables indicating if FDI is encouraged in 
the industry of the firm according to the Catalogue of Industries 
for Guiding Foreign Investment. The catalogue was amended in 
the years 1997, 2002, 2005 and 2007. Sources: National 
Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Commerce.  
Regional GDP per capita Regional GDP per capita in RMB as a proxy to control for city 
and county-level agglomeration effects. Real values at 2005 prices 
are calculated by using a GDP deflation index. We observe GDP 
per capita annually for 284 cities and counties. Based on the 4-
digit city-level postcode of the firm’s headquarter each firm is 
matched with the closest city or county for which GDP per capita 
data is available. Data source: China Economic Information 
Network. 
 
Control variables 
 
Industry Dummy variables according to the Chinese Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC). 2-digit level for manufacturing, 1-digit 
level for the rest. Data source: Compustat. 
Province  Dummy variables controlling for each of the 31 provinces in 
which our firms are located. These variables are based on the 6-
digit postcode of the firm’s headquarter. Data source: Compustat. 
Year Dummy variables controlling for the year of observation. 
 
